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Money matters: the financing of the Conservative Party 
Justin Fisher (Brunel University) 
Introduction 
The Conservatives entered the 2001 election in the novel position of being the poorer of 
the two main parties. Since 1997, Labour’s income and expenditure had outstripped that 
of the Tories. Nevertheless, in the build up to the election at least, some traditional 
patterns were maintained – the Conservatives received more than Labour in the way of 
both individual and corporate donations. Even without the £5,000,000 donation made by 
Paul Getty days before the election, the Conservatives’ volume of individual donations 
outstripped that of Labour.
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 In addition, the amount of non-cash donations (donations in-
kind) received by the Conservatives dwarfed those received by other parties. Of course, 
the Conservatives lost the election badly, and without the evidence of a sustained 
electoral recovery, one might have expected the party’s income to suffer. This article 
examines, amongst other things, whether or not this was the case. 
 
Income and Expenditure 
Full details of the party’s income and expenditure post the 2001 elections are, at the time 
of writing, relatively limited. Nevertheless for the period up until December 2002, some 
patterns emerge. First, donations continue to play a key role in the party’s finances. In the 
twelve months to 31
st
 March 2002, they constituted 52% of the central party’s income, 
whilst in the nine months to December 31
st
 2002 the figure was 58%. The next largest 
source of income was state money – mainly in the form of Short and Cranborne money, 
but also including new grants from the Electoral Commission. In the nine months to 
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December 31
st
 2002, this constituted 29% of the party’s income. Finally, income from 
membership subscriptions and constituency parties remained modest: around 7% of the 
income received in the nine months to the end of 2002.  
 
In terms of expenditure, similar patterns observed in the 1990s were apparent – namely 
that routine expenditure constituted a significant financial burden. Even in the accounting 
year which included the election (twelve months to March 2002), routine running costs 
accounted for over 40% of expenditure, whilst in the nine months to the end of 2002, the 
comparable figure was 74%. Added to that, 17% of expenditure was spent on fundraising. 
All of which again illustrates the point that parties require significant sums beside 
elections simply to maintain themselves as going concerns. Parties do have too much 
money, they have too little. 
 
Conservatives in Comparison 
 
Making direct comparisons between parties’ income and expenditure has, up until 
recently, been plagued with a certain degree of imprecision. The principal reason for this 
was that parties’ financial year-ends differed. All of this is about to change, with the 
parties uniting around a December year-end. However, the most current accounts 
available (ending 31
st
 December 2002) still make exact comparisons difficult – the 
Conservatives detailing on the nine months up to December 31
st
, Labour the full twelve. 
Nevertheless, the accounts do reveal that Labour remained the wealthier of the two main 
parties. The Conservatives raised £9.9 million compared with Labour’s £21 million. Even 
if we add the sums received by the Tories in declared donations for the first quarter on 
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2002 (some £1.6 million), it is clear that Conservative income was some way below that 
of Labour, as was also the case with expenditure. The silver lining for the Conservatives 
was that whilst Labour declared net liabilities of some £7 million, the Tories declared net 
assets of some £3.6 million, though this was financed in part by interest free loans 
repayable on demand from constituency associations. 
 
When comparing the Conservatives’ income with that of the other parties, it is clear that 
the patterns reported at the 2001 general election largely remained. The number and 
volume of all donations received by Labour (which includes trade union affiliations) was 
larger by some margin. For example in the final quarter of 2003, Labour received 219 
declared donations totalling some £4million - more than twice the sum received by the 
Conservatives. Indeed, the volume of Conservative donations after the election never 
once exceeded 50% of those received by Labour and on average the figure was 31%. 
Nevertheless, by and large the Conservatives continued to receive more corporate and 
non-cash donations in both number and volume – the latter by some margin. In the case 
of individual donations however, there was a change. Whilst the Conservatives received 
most in number, the volume of such donations was generally of a higher value for 
Labour. 
 
The Large Donors 
As reported elsewhere, the new transparency engendered by the Political Parties, 
Elections & Referendums Act allowed for the identification of key donors.
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 In the run up 
to the last election, Stuart Wheeler made a donation of £5 million and made a further 
donation of nearly £2.5 million during the campaign. And, of course, Paul Getty gave 
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some £5 million on the eve of the election. After the election, however, there were no 
further seven figure gifts. Indeed, until the end of 2003 at least, there were only two 
exceeding £250k. IIR Ltd, a ‘knowledge and skills transfer company’ made one donation 
of £520k in early 2002, whilst Stuart Wheeler again contributed just over £500k in the 
aftermath of the fall of Iain Duncan-Smith. However, whilst there were no large 
individual gifts, some companies and individuals made a series of regular donations, 
which were smaller in size, but cumulatively large. Examples included IIR Ltd again, 
who made further cash donations totalling some £819k in addition to a further £92k of 
non-cash donations. Another key donor was former party treasurer, Sir Stanley Kalms. 
He made cash donations totalling £480k and a further £48k in non-cash gifts. Further key 
donors included Flowidea Ltd, an investment and holding company, who made a series of 
cash donations totalling £307k; joint founder of Hambro Magan, George Magan (who 
succeeded Stanley Kalms as Treasurer), who made six donations totalling £263k and 
Abbey Business Centres (part of the IIR Group), who made non-cash donations of £150k. 
In addition, as a result of the enhanced state funding engendered by both the Neill 
Committee and the Political Parties, Elections & Referendums Act, the party received 
nearly £9.8 million in various forms of state-aid. Not all of these were new forms of 
money, however. Short and Cranborne money had been in existence for some while, 
though the amounts were enhanced post-Neill.  
 
Despite these increases in state income, the party remained opposed to significant 
extensions of public provision to political parties. In its evidence to the Electoral 
Commission investigations into party funding, the Conservatives argued that public 
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money should instead be spent on schools and hospitals, and reiterated objections made 
to the Neill Committee - that forcing taxpayers to fund parties that they do not support 
would be wrong. Instead, the party argued that the idea of tax relief for small donations 
should be resurrected as a means of promoting a broader funding base for the parties. 
This idea was included in the original Neill Committee report, but was dropped by the 
government, who claimed that this was state funding by stealth, since such monies would 
normally go to the Treasury. The Conservatives, however, argued that there was ‘…a 
clear difference between the state providing lump sum payments to a political party and 
the state opting not to tax money that is freely given by an individual to a party.’3 
 
The Impact of IDS 
The quarterly data on donations, reported by the Electoral Commission, demonstrate 
some interesting patterns. First, in terms of the number of donations made overall and 
those broken down by companies and individuals, there had been no clear trend. 
However, in the last quarter of 2003, which coincided with the change of Conservative 
leader, donations rose both in number and in volume (see Figures 1 and 2). For example, 
during quarter three of 2003, a total of 73 declared cash donations were made. During 
quarter four of that year, there were 138. This was easily the highest number of donations 
in any quarter since the election, the previous high being 90. The sharp rise was apparent 
in all three principal kinds of donation – individual, corporate and non-cash. Not 
surprisingly, the rise in the number of donations was also reflected in the volume. £1.6 
million was received in cash donations in quarter four compared with £689k in quarter 
three. And whilst some donations were made just prior to the fall of Iain Duncan-Smith, 
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the vast majority were made after his resignation on October 29
th
. 81% of the donations 
in that quarter were accepted after that date, totalling 94% of the volume received. The 
inescapable inference to be drawn was that the change in Conservative leadership in late 
2003 stimulated donations to a degree not witnessed since the 2001 general election 
campaign. Financially, at least, replacing Iain Duncan Smith was a successful act – at 
least in the short term. It should also be noted, however, that the removal of Mr Duncan-
Smith also coincided with a dramatic rise in the number of individual donations made to 
the Liberal Democrats. The party received 119 donations compared with a post election 
quarterly high of 55. This generated £216k, some £53k more in real terms than the 
previous quarterly post election high. 
 
Soon after his election, new leader, Michael Howard established the Conservative Party 
Foundation, designed to put party finances on a sound long-term footing. The Foundation 
is charged with raising money for the next general election and in the longer term, 
building an endowment fund. To set the ball rolling, the proceeds from the sale of 
Conservative Central Office in Smith Square will be placed in the fund. 
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Figure 1 
No. of Declared Conservative Donations
Q2 2001 - Q4 2003
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Figure 2 
 
Value of Declared Conservative 
Donations Q3 2001 - Q4 2003
Source: Electoral Commission
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Money Talks?  
The study of party finance is unfortunately riddled with innuendo and half-truths, with 
assumptions made about the motivations of donors, which often have little basis in 
genuine evidence. Indeed, this problem actually increased when the new transparency 
regulations were first introduced.
4
 As in previous cases, however, there was scant 
evidence to support the claims that money was influencing politics. Nevertheless, two 
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recent episodes in Conservative financing suggest that large donations may at least have 
served to highlight particular concerns.  
 
The first episode concerned Michael Ashcroft, a former party treasurer and generous 
donor. In November 2003, he declared that whilst he would be contributing £2 million to 
enhance the party’s electoral prospects, he would not be donating it to the central party. 
Rather, he said that constituency associations in marginal seats could apply to him for the 
money. His reasoning was that money needed to be targeted at marginal seats in order to 
reduce Labour’s majority, or even defeat it at the next election. He claimed that 85% of 
full time agents were based safe Conservative seats and there were only 19 in marginal 
seats. Whilst empirical evidence suggests that his claim was something of an 
exaggeration, he was correct in claiming that safe Conservative seats are far more likely 
to employ a full time agent. Indeed, evidence shows that this has been a long-term 
problem for the Conservatives – their strong campaigns have often been in safe seats. 
And, although Fisher et al show that the central Conservative party has been more 
successful at channelling resources at target seats, the party is still less effective in this 
respect than Labour or indeed the Liberal Democrats, one likely reason being the 
traditionally independent stance of the constituency associations.
5
 The significance of 
Ashcroft’s stance was that a large donor was able to highlight a particular problem for the 
party and try to alleviate it, effectively by only providing income for local parties which 
he considered to be worthy recipients. In electoral terms, Ashcroft’s stance was entirely 
rational, but it raises at least some questions about the role of a donor in helping 
determine the party’s electoral strategy. 
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The second more substantive question was the role played by Stuart Wheeler in the 
Conservative leadership election in 2003. Mr. Wheeler had made significant donations in 
the run up to the 2001 election. However, in the contest to succeed the outgoing leader, 
William Hague, he declared that he would not back a Conservative Party led by Kenneth 
Clarke. In the end, despite Mr Clarke being defeated, Wheeler made only relatively small 
donations (totalling around £28k) whilst Mr Duncan-Smith was in charge. However, in 
the period just before the fall of Duncan-Smith, Wheeler publicly declared that he should 
be removed, calling on Conservative MPs to begin the process (which, of course, duly 
happened). The point here was not that Mr Wheeler expressed such a view (which as a 
Conservative supporter, he was perfectly at liberty to do). Rather, it was the publicity that 
his comments generated. In that sense, with the active compliance of BBC Radio Four 
(on which the declaration was made), the opinions of someone whose only political claim 
to fame was that he was a significant donor, were given particular credence at a 
politically sensitive time. This is not in any way to cast aspersions on Mr Wheeler – 
rather to point out that his donations had given him a platform, not provided for other 
Conservative supporters. And, as we have seen, soon after the fall of Duncan-Smith, Mr 
Wheeler’s donations resumed. 
 
Electoral Commission 
In 2003, the Electoral Commission announced a review into the funding of political 
parties. In one sense, this might have seemed odd given that the Political Parties, 
Elections and Referendums Act had only been in force for a short period of time. 
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However, the Act had barely been passed before questions arose as to whether the 
legislation had gone far enough.
6
 Particular attention was paid to imposing caps on 
donations. The Conservative response was negative. The party argued that the ability to 
make a donation was a mark of a free society, and that any attempt to introduce a cap was 
a curtailment of the rights of UK citizens. Instead, the party argued that the transparency 
engendered by Political Parties, Elections & Referendums Act was sufficient for voters to 
decide whether donations were inappropriate. Nevertheless, whilst the party did think a 
cap of donations would be an infringement of rights, it did think that spending caps on 
parties were legitimate as a means of limiting political costs. 
 
Conclusions 
The patterns established in the run-up to the 2001 election have largely been maintained. 
The Conservatives are the poorer of the two main parties, but still receive more in the 
way at least of corporate and non-cash donations. Like the other parties, the 
Conservatives are under-funded, yet continue to reject the principle of significant state 
aid. The picture however may change. Early indications suggest that the change of 
leadership has stimulated donations and sustained success in mid-term elections may see 
that trend continue. If the party appears to be ‘going places’, the indications are that 
enhanced income will follow.  Yet the party must be wary of the glare of publicity that 
large donations attract. The suspicion of the motives of many donors is frequently 
unjustified. However, the party will continue to attract unwelcome publicity (however 
unjustified) if donors appear to be trying to change party thinking in one way or another. 
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Donation caps are one way of trying to alleviate this problem – but the Conservatives 
(like Labour) continue to oppose them. 
 
Justin Fisher is Senior Lecturer in Political Science at Brunel University 
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